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Publicatie Laka-bibliotheek:
International Terrorism: The Vulnerabilities and Protection of Nuclear Facilities (2002)

Auteur	WISE Paris, Large & Associates
	6-02-0-20-03.pdf
Datum	december 2002
Classificatie	6.02.0.20/03 (ZELFBOUW A-BOMMEN EN (DREIGING) MET RADIOACTIEVE BESMETTING (NSS))
Voorkant

John Large & Mycle Schneider, International Terrorism and Nuclear Facilities †
International Terrorism - The Vulnerabilities and Protection of Nuclear Facilities

John H Large Large & Associates, Consulting Engineers, London, United Kingdom
Mycle Schneider World Information Service on Energy (WISE-Paris), France

After the events of 11th September, it is perhaps just ashort and logical step for
terrorists to latch onto how highly hazardous plants might be triggered into releasing
energy and toxins via an aerial attack or other mode of attack. If and when so, could
it be that such plants cannot provide a robust defence against aerial attack and are
there particularly vulnerable parts of the buildings and processes that, if penetrated,
could lead to a devastating release of energy and toxins?

Nuclear plants are such highly hazardous plants. These plants undertake a variety of
processes, some of which involve intensely radioactive materials and highly reactive
chemicals. Moreover, being nuclear there is a public perception of dread and fear
(ie a fate worse than death) associated with radioactive release which might, it could
beargued, render plants such as BNFL Sellafield and COGEMA Cap La Hague attractive
targets to terrorists. However, to mount an attack on a nuclear plant the terrorist
cellwould have to plan ahead, locate the particularly hazardous plants and stores,
determine the amount and nature of the radioactive contents and howreadily this
might be dispersed into the atmosphere, and identify the most vulnerable aspects
of the buildings andcontainments of the targeted plants.

This paper examines how and by which means those planning such a hypothetical
act of terrorism might obtain this sort information and, from this, how potential
target systems and processes within a nuclear plant are identified. The work has
intentionally confined itself to information and documentation available in the
public domain, although it is assumed that those involved would either possess or
successfully seek some relatively elementary knowledge of building construction,
radioactive materials and substances, reactor fuel, its radioactivity and chemistry.

† First presented at the Oxford Research Group Nuclear Terrorism in Britain:
Risks and Realities seminar at Rhodes House, Oxford of 4 December 2002