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Germany, Plutonium & Proliferation -The unstated threat (1995)

AuteurM.Küntzel
Datum1995
Classificatie2.01.3.10/14 (DUITSLAND - ONTWIKKELING A-BOM / PLUTONIUMEKONOMIE)
Voorkant

Uit de publicatie:

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear proliferation is an issue likely to have a higher profile during 1995 than ever 
before. In the post-Cold War world, it is hailed as one of the emerging threats to 
global security. In April this year a decision is due to be made on the future of the 
NPT or Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The predominant view in the industrialised 
world is that the proliferation threat comes from countries in the South, and it is the 
NPT which contains this threat. Consequently, the NPT must be extended - in its 
existing form indefinitely. Anything else, this view goes, will lead to greater 
proliferation. But the real history of the NPT and nuclear proliferation tells a different 
story, and leads to a very different conclusion as to the worth of the Treaty.

In an attempt to broaden the debate over proliferation, this paper summarises the role 
played by Germany. A country generally considered not a proliferation threat, and 
yet it has played a very distinct role in undermining effective nuclear non-
proliferation. Although the country's nuclear industry has come under international 
scrutiny for its poor record in nuclear technology proliferation, its political 
establishment has tended to remain unblemished. However, Germany played a key 
role in weakening the instruments of the NPT during the drafting of the Treaty 
almost 30 years ago. In addition, along with Japan, successive German governments 
have defended the right of non-nuclear weapons states to acquire large stockpiles of 
weapons-usable plutonium.

It is highly topical at this time to highlight the historical and contempory role 
played by Germany in non-proliferation affairs. For in addition to a decision on the 
future of the NPT due in 1995, three other issues with major international 
implications are in the process of negotiation. Firstly, Germany is currently playing 
a lead role in the renegotiation of the US-EURATOM Agreement, which expires at
the end of 1995. Along with the UK and France, Germany is resisting all efforts by 
the US to exercise its legitimate control over European nuclear activities. This 
should not be surprising as Germany was instrumental during the 1950's in
establishing EURATOM, as a way of excluding US and international safeguards 
concerning its nuclear activities. Secondly, the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva during 1995 will probably begin negotiations for a halt or 
cut-off in fissile materials production- including plutonium. While it is understood 
that Germany is leading the call for international control over plutonium within the 
arsenals of the nuclear weapons states, it will not volunteer for international control 
over its own plutonium stockpile. Efforts to extend the cut-off to include all fissile 
material have been rejected by Germany. And finally, as part of the move towards 
European defence and foreign policy
harmonization due to be agreed in 1996, a debate has already begun over the 
integration of nuclear weapons into a common EU defence policy. The issue of a 
European nuclear force, specifically allowed for within the NPT during its drafting 
in the 1960's- at the insistence of Germany- has already been quietly resurrected.

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