Publication Laka-library:
Germany, Plutonium & Proliferation -The unstated threat (1995)
| Author | M.Küntzel |
| Date | 1995 |
| Classification | 2.01.3.10/14 (GERMANY - DEVELOPMENT A BOMB / PLUTONIUM ECONOMY) |
| Front | ![]() |
From the publication:
INTRODUCTION Nuclear proliferation is an issue likely to have a higher profile during 1995 than ever before. In the post-Cold War world, it is hailed as one of the emerging threats to global security. In April this year a decision is due to be made on the future of the NPT or Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The predominant view in the industrialised world is that the proliferation threat comes from countries in the South, and it is the NPT which contains this threat. Consequently, the NPT must be extended - in its existing form indefinitely. Anything else, this view goes, will lead to greater proliferation. But the real history of the NPT and nuclear proliferation tells a different story, and leads to a very different conclusion as to the worth of the Treaty. In an attempt to broaden the debate over proliferation, this paper summarises the role played by Germany. A country generally considered not a proliferation threat, and yet it has played a very distinct role in undermining effective nuclear non- proliferation. Although the country's nuclear industry has come under international scrutiny for its poor record in nuclear technology proliferation, its political establishment has tended to remain unblemished. However, Germany played a key role in weakening the instruments of the NPT during the drafting of the Treaty almost 30 years ago. In addition, along with Japan, successive German governments have defended the right of non-nuclear weapons states to acquire large stockpiles of weapons-usable plutonium. It is highly topical at this time to highlight the historical and contempory role played by Germany in non-proliferation affairs. For in addition to a decision on the future of the NPT due in 1995, three other issues with major international implications are in the process of negotiation. Firstly, Germany is currently playing a lead role in the renegotiation of the US-EURATOM Agreement, which expires at the end of 1995. Along with the UK and France, Germany is resisting all efforts by the US to exercise its legitimate control over European nuclear activities. This should not be surprising as Germany was instrumental during the 1950's in establishing EURATOM, as a way of excluding US and international safeguards concerning its nuclear activities. Secondly, the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva during 1995 will probably begin negotiations for a halt or cut-off in fissile materials production- including plutonium. While it is understood that Germany is leading the call for international control over plutonium within the arsenals of the nuclear weapons states, it will not volunteer for international control over its own plutonium stockpile. Efforts to extend the cut-off to include all fissile material have been rejected by Germany. And finally, as part of the move towards European defence and foreign policy harmonization due to be agreed in 1996, a debate has already begun over the integration of nuclear weapons into a common EU defence policy. The issue of a European nuclear force, specifically allowed for within the NPT during its drafting in the 1960's- at the insistence of Germany- has already been quietly resurrected.
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