Publicatie Laka-bibliotheek:
The GNEP; will it advance nonproliferation or undermine it?

AuteurEdwin S. Lyman
6-03-2-30-03.pdf
Datumjuni 2006
Classificatie 6.03.2.30/03 (PROLIFERATIE - FUEL BANK / GNEP / GNPI)
Voorkant

Uit de publicatie:

                 THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP:
            WILL IT ADVANCE NONPROLIFERATION OR UNDERMINE IT?
                                      Edwin S. Lyman
                       Senior Staff Scientist, Global Security Program
                   Union of Concerned Scientists, 1707 H St, NW, Ste. 600
                                   Washington, DC 20006

ABSTRACT
In February 2006, the Department of Energy announced the creation of a major new program
known as the "Global Nuclear Energy Partnership" (GNEP). Although details are sketchy at this
time, the program as currently described would involve the institution of international arrangements
by which certain "supplier" nations, including the United States, would lease nuclear fuel to other
nations, in exchange for commitments that the recipient nations would not seek nuclear fuel
production facilities of their own. The supply agreements would also provide for the return of the
spent fuel to one or more of the supplier nations. An integral part of the GNEP proposal would be
the development and deployment of modified reprocessing technologies that would be used to
extract plutonium and other actinides from spent fuel, as well as fast neutron reactors capable of
efficiently using fuel incorporating the recovered actinides. Among the various motivations cited for
the program, its alleged benefits for nonproliferation have been stressed. According to DOE, "The
Partnership would demonstrate the critical technologies needed to change the way nuclear fuel is
managed ... while simultaneously promoting non-proliferation." However, DOE has not been able
to convincingly explain how this proposal would actually advance nonproliferation. On the other
hand, critics maintain that a reversal of the de facto moratorium on reprocessing in the United States
would only undermine efforts to keep existing stockpiles of weapon-usable materials out of the
hands of states of concern and terrorists. This paper will analyze whether the GNEP proposal i