Stichting Laka

Publicatie Laka-bibliotheek:
Vol II, Part 4: Savannah River, Working Group Assessment (1994)

AuteurPlutonium Working Gr US DoE
Datumseptember 1994
Classificatie3.01.5.30/11 (VS - KERNWAPENFABRIEKEN EN SCHOONMAAK)
Voorkant

Uit de publicatie:

Savannah River Site

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the results of the Working Group Assessment Team (WGAT) 
evaluation of plutonium environment, safety, and health (ES&H) vulnerabilities at 
the Savannah River Site (SRS). Plutonium ES&H vulnerabilities are defined as 
"conditions or weaknesses that could lead to unnecessary or increased radiation 
exposure of workers, release of radioactive materials to the environment, or 
radiation exposure of the public."

The WGA r consisted of 15 team members from the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE), DOE contractors, and consulting firms. The WGAT conducted its assessment 
at SRS from July 6, 1994, to July 20, 1994. Assessment activities included detailed 
review of a SRS self-assessment report on plutonium vulnerabilities developed by 
the Site Assessment Team (SAT), inspection of SRS plutonium facilities, table top 
discussions with SRS staff regarding potential vulnerabilities, and review of SRS 
technical reports and analyses related to vulnerabilities.

The WGAT and SAT reviewed ten major SRS facilities with plutonium 
holdings. These facilities are:

(1) FB Line. A plutonium processing and storage facility associated with F-Canyon.
(2) 235-F. A plutonium storage facility with deactivated processing operations.
(3) F-Canyon. A processing facility for separation of uranium, plutonium, and other
transuranic materials from irradiated targets, other plutonium bearing feeds, and 
spent fuels.
(4) H-Canyon. A processing facility for separation of highly enriched uranium and
transuranic materials from spent fuel and irradiated targets, and for purification of 
plutonium-238.
(5) HB Line. A plutonium-238 processing and storage facility associated with
H-Canyon.
(6) Old HB Line. An inactive plutonium- 238 processing facility presently
undergoing decontamination and decommissioning.
(7) Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels. A facility for underwater storage of spent
fuel, which currently also stores some unirradiated plutonium fuel.
(8) Savannah River Technology Center. A multi-purpose research and
development facility that handles small quantities of plutonium.
(9) Central Labs. An analytical laboratory in F-Area that handles small
quantity plutonium samples.
(10) 321-M. A reactor fuel and target manufacturing facility which currently
stores reactor fuel and some target tubes containing neptunium.

The WGAT reviewed the 50 potential vulnerabilities identified by the SAT and 
concluded that 33 were vulnerabilities and 17 were not vulnerabilities, according 
to WGAT criteria. The WGAT also identified two additional vulnerabilities that 
were not covered by the SAT report. The WGAT results are summarized in 
Tables ES-1 and ES-2.

Deze publicatie is alleen op papier bij Laka beschikbaar, niet als pdf.
Publicaties zijn te leen of informeer of we een kopie kunnen maken. Soms, als we tijd hebben, lukt dat tegen kostprijs van de kopieën.