Laka Foundation

Publication Laka-library:
Verification. How Much Is Enough? (1985)

AuthorAllan S.Krass /SIPRI
Date1985
Classification6.03.2.10/07 (PROLIFERATION - CTBT / VERIFICATION / SIMULATION)
Front

From the publication:

Verification - How Much is Enough?

The level of anxiety and suspicion between the USA and the USSR has rarely been
higher than it is today. Many advocates of arms control believe that effective
verification would reduce tensions and lessen the risk of war. This book analyses
the two main issues of verification. One is technological: what are the present
capabilities of various verification techniques and what is their potential? The
devices and methods currently employed by the two major nuclear powers and by
international organizations to monitor the compliance of states with arms control
or disarmament treaties are examined. The second issue is political: how do US
and Soviet approaches compare, what are the roles of domestic and bureaucratic
politics, and on what criteria can a workable standard of adequacy be based?
In short, how much is enough?

Although the study concludes that a number of significant arms control measures
can already be adequately verified, modern weapons are becoming more mobile and
it is becoming easier to conceal them. There is a danger that the ability to hide
weapons will outstrip the ability to find them. Verification cannot promise to detect
all violations; a workable standard of adequacy in verification must derive from the
ability to detect militarily significant violations.

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