Publication Laka-library:
A Faustian Bargain. Why 'Stockpile Stewardship' is fundamentally incompatible with the process of nuclear disarmament (1998)
| Author | A.Lichterman, J.Cabasso |
| Date | April 1998 |
| Classification | 3.01.3.12/09 (UNITED STATES - PROLIFERATION POLICY - NUCLEAR WEAPONS & TESTS) |
| Front | ![]() |
From the publication:
INTRODUCTION In June 1997, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released a report entitled The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy. The report recommended fundamental changes in United States nuclear weapons policy, suggesting negotiation of rapid U.S. and Russian forces reductions that would "begin with a quick cut to about 2,000 deployed strategic warheads each as envisioned in the Helsinki summit, then move to reductions to a total inventory of about 1,000 warheads each, and finally to a total inventory of a few hundred warheads on each side." (Emphasis in original.) (1) The report went on to explore "the conditions under which it might be possible to prohibit nuclear weapons altogether and possible paths to reach that goal, " (2) stating that "[a]fter considering the [] risks and benefits, the committee has concluded that an essential long-term goal of U.S. policy should be the creation of international conditions in which the possession of nuclear weapons would no longer be perceived as necessary or legitimate for the preservation of national security and international stability." (3) In its analysis, the NAS also called into question other important aspects of current U.S. nuclear weapons policy which are receiving little public debate, including the use of nuclear weapons to deter the proliferation or use of chemical and biological weapons, the maintenance of a large arsenal of reserve nuclear warheads as reductions in deployed strategic arsenals go forward, and the indefinite retention of a nuclear weapons complex sufficient to rapidly reconstitute a substantial nuclear arsenal. The NAS report is the most recent in a growing number of proposals for systematic approaches to nuclear disarmament being advanced by mainstream arms control groups, beginning with substantial steps to be taken immediately. These proposals, ranging from the report issued in August 1996 by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, (4) to the Stimson Center's "Building a Nuclear- Weapon-Free World," (5) and others, have certain general elements in common. All see adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an historically important nonproliferation and disarmament measure. All suggest that rapid, deep cuts in nuclear arsenals are achievable. All see strict accounting for weapons- useable nuclear materials as a central element of a workable verification regime. And all contemplate a verification system that will be likely to require intrusive on-site inspections of nuclear weapons facilities at some point before elimination of existing arsenals can be accomplished, thus requiring an unprecedented degree of transparency of currently highly secretive military research, testing, and arms production activities. Another common element is the recognition that a greater commitment must be shown by the world's leading nuclear power if the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is to be achieved.
This publication is only available at Laka on paper, not as pdf.
You can borrow the publication or request a copy. When we're available, this is possible for a small fee.

