Laka Foundation

Publication Laka-library:
A Faustian Bargain. Why 'Stockpile Stewardship' is fundamentally incompatible with the process of nuclear disarmament (1998)

AuthorA.Lichterman, J.Cabasso
DateApril 1998
Classification3.01.3.12/09 (UNITED STATES - PROLIFERATION POLICY - NUCLEAR WEAPONS & TESTS)
Front

From the publication:

INTRODUCTION

In June 1997, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released a report entitled
The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy. The report recommended fundamental 
changes in United States nuclear weapons policy, suggesting negotiation of rapid U.S. 
and Russian forces reductions that would "begin with a quick cut to about 2,000 
deployed strategic warheads each as envisioned in the Helsinki summit, then move 
to reductions to a total inventory of about 1,000 warheads each, and finally to a total 
inventory of a few hundred warheads on each side." (Emphasis in original.) (1) The 
report went on to explore "the conditions under which it might be possible to prohibit 
nuclear weapons altogether and possible paths to reach that goal, " (2) stating that 
"[a]fter considering the [] risks and benefits, the committee has concluded that an 
essential long-term goal of U.S. policy should be the creation of international 
conditions in which the possession of nuclear weapons would no longer be perceived 
as necessary or legitimate for the preservation of national security and international 
stability." (3) In its analysis, the NAS also called into question other important 
aspects of current U.S. nuclear weapons policy which are receiving little public 
debate, including the use of nuclear weapons to deter the proliferation or use of 
chemical and biological weapons, the maintenance of a large arsenal of reserve 
nuclear warheads as reductions in deployed strategic arsenals go forward, and the 
indefinite retention of a nuclear weapons complex sufficient to rapidly reconstitute 
a substantial nuclear arsenal.

The NAS report is the most recent in a growing number of proposals for systematic 
approaches to nuclear disarmament being advanced by mainstream arms control 
groups, beginning with substantial steps to be taken immediately. These proposals, 
ranging from the report issued in August 1996 by the Canberra Commission on the 
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, (4) to the Stimson Center's "Building a Nuclear-
Weapon-Free World," (5) and others, have certain general elements in common. 
All see adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an historically 
important nonproliferation and disarmament measure. All suggest that rapid, deep 
cuts in nuclear arsenals are achievable. All see strict accounting for weapons-
useable nuclear materials as a central element of a workable verification regime. 
And all contemplate a verification system that will be likely to require intrusive 
on-site inspections of nuclear weapons facilities at some point before elimination 
of existing arsenals can be accomplished, thus requiring an unprecedented degree 
of transparency of currently highly secretive military research, testing, and arms 
production activities. Another common element is the recognition that a greater 
commitment must be shown by the world's leading nuclear power if the ultimate 
goal of nuclear disarmament is to be achieved.

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